This paper attempts to provide a decision-theoretic foundation for the measurement of economic tail risk, which is not only closely related to utility theory but also relevant to statistical model uncertainty. The main result is that the only tail risk measure that satisfies a set of economic axioms proposed by Schmeidler (1989, Econometrica) and the statistical property of elicitability (i.e. there exists an objective function such that minimizing the expected objective function yields the risk measure; see Gneiting (2011, J. Amer. Stat. Assoc.)) is median shortfall, which is the median of tail loss distribution. Elicitability is important for backtesting. Median shortfall has a desirable property of distributional robustness with respect to model misspecification. We also extend the result to address model uncertainty by incorporating multiple scenarios. As an application, we argue that median shortfall is a better alternative than expected shortfall for setting capital requirements in Basel Accords. We thank Ruodu Wang for helpful comments. We are also grateful to the seminar and conference participants at
Introduction
This paper attempts to provide a decision-theoretic foundation for the measurement of economic tail risk. Two important applications are setting insurance premiums and capital requirements for financial institutions. For example, a widely used class of risk measures for setting insurance risk premiums is proposed by Wang, Young and Panjer (1997) based on a set of axioms. In terms of capital requirements, Gordy (2003) provides a theoretical foundation for the Basel Accord banking book risk measure, by demonstrating that under certain conditions the risk measure is asymptotically equivalent to the 99.9% Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is a widely used approach for the measurement of tail risk; the estimation and backtesting of VaR have been well studied in the literature, see, e.g., Pan (1997, 2001) , Jorion (2007) , and Gaglianone, Lima, Linton and Smith (2011) .
In this paper we focus on two aspects of risk measurement. First, risk measurement is closely related to utility theories of risk preferences. The papers that are most relevant to the present paper are Schmeidler (1986 Schmeidler ( , 1989 , which extend the expected utility theory by relaxing the independence axiom to the comonotonic independence axiom; this class of risk preference can successfully explain various violation of the expectation utility theory, such as the Ellsberg paradox. Second, a major difficulty in measuring tail risk is that the tail part of a loss distribution is difficult to estimate and hence bears substantial model uncertainty. As emphasized by Hansen (2013) , "uncertainty can come from limited data, unknown models and misspecification of those models."
In face of statistical uncertainty, different procedures may be used to forecast the risk measure. It is hence desirable to be able to evaluate which procedure gives a better forecast. The elicitability of a risk measure is a property based on a decisiontheoretic framework for evaluating the performance of different forecasting procedures (Gneiting (2011) ). The elicitability of a risk measure means that the risk measure can be obtained by minimizing the expectation of a forecasting objective function; then, the forecasting objective function can be used for evaluating different forecasting procedures.
Elicitability is closely related to backtesting, whose objective is to evaluate the performance of a risk forecasting model. If a risk measure is elicitable, then the sample average forecasting error based on the objective function can be used for backtesting the risk measure. Gneiting (2011) shows that VaR is elicitable but expected shortfall is not, which "may challenge the use of the expected shortfall as a predictive measure of risk, and may provide a partial explanation for the lack of literature on the evaluation of expected shortfall forecasts, as opposed to quantile or VaR forecasts." Gaglianone, Lima, Linton and Smith (2011) propose a backtest for evaluating VaR estimates that delivers more power in finite samples than existing methods and develop a mechanism to find out why and when a model is misspecified; see also Jorion (2007, Ch. 6 ). Linton and Xiao (2013) point out that VaR has an advantage over expected shortfall as the asymptotic inference procedures for VaR "has the same asymptotic behavior regardless of the thickness of the tails."
The main result of the paper is that the only tail risk measure that satisfies both a set of economic axioms proposed by Schmeidler (1989) and the statistical requirement of elicitability (Gneiting (2011) ) is median shortfall, which is the median of the tail loss distribution and is also the VaR at a higher confidence level. In addition, we show that median shortfall has the desirable property of distributional robustness with respect to model misspecification in the sense of Hampel (1971) , which means that a small deviation in the model only results in a small change in the risk measurement.
A risk measure is said to be robust if (i) it can accommodate model misspecification (possibly by incorporating multiple scenarios and models) and (ii) it has distributional robustness. The first part of the meaning of robustness is related to ambiguity and model uncertainty in decision theory. To address these issues, multiple priors or multiple models may be used; see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) , Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2007) , Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) , Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) , and Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2012) . We also incorporate multiple models in this paper; see Section 3. We complement these papers by studying (i) the link between risk measures and statistical uncertainty via elicitability and (ii) distributional robustness of risk measures.
Important contribution to measurement of risk based on economic axioms includes Aumann and Serrano (2008) , Hart (2009, 2013) , and Hart (2011) , which study risk measurement of gambles (i.e., random variables with positive mean and taking negative values with positive probability). This paper complement their results by linking economic axioms for risk measurement with statistical model uncertainty; in addition, our approach focuses on the measurement of tail risk for general random variables. Thus, the risk measure considered in this paper has a different objective. As pointed out by Aumann and Serrano (2008) , "like any index or summary statistic, . . . , the riskiness index summarizes a complex, high-dimensional object by a single number. Needless to say, no index captures all the relevant aspects of the situation being summarized."
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main result of the paper. In Section 3, we propose to use a scenario aggregation function to combine risk measurements under multiple models. In Section 4, we apply the results in previous sections to the study of Basel Accord capital requirements. Section 5 is devoted to relevant comments.
Main Results

Axioms and Representation
Let (Ω, F , P ) be a probability space that describes the states and the probability of occurrence of states at a future time T . Assume the probability space is large enough so that one can define a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Let a random variable X defined on the probability space denote the random loss of a portfolio of financial assets that will be realized at time T . Then −X is the random profit of the portfolio. Let X be a set of random variables that include all bounded random variables, i.e., X ⊃ L ∞ (Ω, F , P ). 1 A risk measure ρ is a functional defined on X that maps a random variable X to a real number ρ(X). The specification of X depends on ρ; in particular, X can include unbounded random variables. For example, if ρ is variance, then X can be specified as L 2 (Ω, F , P ); if ρ is VaR, then X can be specified as the set of all proper random variables.
An important relation between two random variables is comonotonicity (Schmeidler (1986)): Two random variables X and Y are said to be comonotonic, if (X(ω 1 ) − X(ω 2 ))(Y (ω 1 ) − Y (ω 2 )) ≥ 0, ∀ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Ω. Let X and Y be the loss of two portfolios, respectively. Suppose that there is a representative agent in the economy and he or she prefers the profit −X to the profit −Y . If the agent is risk averse, then we may say that −X is less risky than −Y . Motivated by this, we propose the following set of axioms, which are based on the axioms for the Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler (1989) ), for the risk measure ρ.
Axiom A1. Comonotonic independence: for all pairwise comonotonic random variables X, Y, Z and for all α ∈ (0, 1), ρ(X) < ρ(Y ) implies that ρ(αX
The first two axioms are the axioms for the Choquet expected utility risk preferences (Schmeidler (1989) ). Axiom A3 with s = 1 is used in Schmeidler (1986) . The constant s in Axiom A3 can be related to the "countercyclical indexing" method proposed in Gordy and Howells (2006) , where a time-varying multiplier s that increases during booms and decreases during recessions is used to dampen the procyclicality of capital requirements; see also Pedersen (2009), Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud and Shin (2009) , and Adrian and Shin (2014) . Axiom A4 is standard for a law invariant risk measure. Axiom A5 states that the risk measurement of an unbounded random variable can be approximated by that of bounded random variables.
A function h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is called a distortion function if h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1, and h is increasing; h may not be left or right continuous. As a direct application of the results in Schmeidler (1986) , we obtain the following representation of a risk measure that satisfies Axioms A1-A5.
Lemma 2.1. Let X ⊃ L ∞ (Ω, F , P ) be a set of random variables (X may include unbounded random variables). A risk measure ρ : X → R satisfies Axioms A1-A5 if and only if there exists a distortion function h(·) such that
where the integral in (1) is the Choquet integral of X with respect to the distorted non-additive probability h • P (A) := h(P (A)), ∀A ∈ F .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we only need to prove for the case s = 1, as ρ satisfies Axioms A1-A5 if and only if 1 s ρ satisfies Axioms A1-A5 (with s = 1 in Axiom A3).
The "only if" part. First, we show that (2) holds for any X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F , P ). Define the set function ν(E) := ρ(1 E ), E ∈ F . Then, it follows from Axiom A2 and A3 that ν is monotonic, ν(∅) = 0, and ν(Ω) = 1. For M ≥ 1, define L M := {X | |X| ≤ M}. For any X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F , P ), let M 0 be the essential supremum of |X| and denote X M 0 := min(M 0 , max(X, −M 0 )). Then X M 0 ∈ L M 0 and X = X M 0 a.s., which implies that ρ(X) = ρ(X M 0 ) (by Axiom A4) and ν(X > x) = ν(X M 0 > x), ∀x. Since ρ satisfies Axioms A1-A3 on L ∞ (Ω, F , P ), it follows that ρ satisfies the conditions (i)-(iii) of the Corollary in Section 3 of Schmeidler (1986) (with B(K) in the corollary defined to be L 1+M 0 ). Hence, it follows from the Corollary that
Let U be a uniform U(0, 1) random variable. Define the function h such that h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1, and h(p) := ρ(1 {U ≤p} ), ∀p ∈ (0, 1). By Axiom A4, h(·) satisfies ν(A) = h(P (A)) for all A. Therefore, by (3), (2) holds for X. In addition, for any 0
Hence, h is an increasing function.
Second, we show that (2) holds for any (possibly unbounded) X ∈ X . For M > 0, since X M belongs to L ∞ (Ω, F , P ), it follows that (2) holds for X M , which implies
Letting M → ∞ on both sides of the above equation and using Axiom A5, we conclude that (2) holds for X.
The "if" part. Suppose h is a distortion function and ρ is defined by (2). Define the set function ν(A) := h(P (A)), ∀A ∈ F . Then ρ(X) is the Choquet integral of X with respect to ν. By definition of ρ and simple verification, ρ satisfies Axioms A2-A5. It follows from Denneberg (1994, Proposition 5 .1) that ρ satisfies positive homogeneity and comonotonic additivity, which implies that ρ satisfies Axiom A1.
Lemma 2.1 extends the representation theorem in Wang, Young and Panjer (1997) as the requirement of lim d→0 ρ((X − d) + ) = ρ(X + ) in their continuity axiom is not needed here. 2 Note that in the case of random variables, the corollary in Schmeidler (1986) requires the random variables to be bounded, but Lemma 2.1 does not; Axiom A5 is automatically satisfied for bounded random variables.
It is clear from (2) that any risk measure satisfying Axioms A1-A5 is monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. 3 Many commonly used risk measures are special cases of risk measures defined in (2).
Example 1. Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is a quantile of the loss distribution at some pre-defined probability level. More precisely, let X be the random loss with general distribution function F X (·), which may not be continuous or strictly increasing. For a given α ∈ (0, 1], VaR of X at level α is defined as
For α = 0, VaR of X at level α is defined to be VaR 0 (X) := inf{x | F X (x) > 0} and VaR 0 (X) is equal to the essential infimum of X. For α ∈ (0, 1], ρ in (2) is equal to
VaR is monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Pan (1997, 2001) and Jorion (2007) provide comprehensive discussions of VaR and risk management.
Example 2. Expected shortfall (ES). For α ∈ [0, 1), ES of X at level α is defined as 4 the mean of the α-tail distribution of X (Tasche (2002) , Rockafellar and Uryasev 2 The axioms used in Wang, Young and Panjer (1997) , including a comonotonic additivity axiom, imply Axioms A1-A5. More precisely, let Q and Q + denote the set of rational numbers and positive rational numbers, respectively. Without loss of generality, suppose s = 1 in Axiom A3. (i) Their comonotonic additivity axiom implies that ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for any X and λ ∈ Q + , which in combination with their standardization axiom ρ(1) = 1 implies ρ(λ) = λρ(1) = λ, λ ∈ Q + . Since ρ(−λ)+ρ(λ) = ρ(0) = 0, it follows that ρ(λ) = λ, ∀λ ∈ Q. Then for any λ ∈ R, there exists {x n } ⊂ Q and {y n } ⊂ Q such that x n ↓ λ and y n ↑ λ. By the monotonic axiom, x n = ρ(x n ) ≥ ρ(λ) ≥ ρ(y n ) = y n . Letting n → ∞ yields ρ(λ) = λ, ∀λ ∈ R; hence, Axiom A3 holds. (ii) By the monotonic axiom, ρ(min(X, M )) ≤ ρ(min(max(X, −M ), M )) ≤ ρ(max(X, −M )). Letting M → ∞ and using the conditions ρ(min(X, M )) → ρ(X) and ρ(max(X, −M )) → ρ(X) as M → ∞ in their continuity axiom, without need of the condition lim d→0 ρ((X − d) + ) = ρ(X + ), Axiom A5 follows. (iii) We then show positive homogeneity holds, i.e. ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for any X and any λ > 0. For any X and M > 0, denote X M := min(max(X, −M ), M ). For any ǫ > 0 and λ > 0, there exist {λ n } ⊂ Q + such that λ n → λ as n → ∞ and λ n ρ(
Letting M → ∞ and applying Axiom A5 result in ρ(λX) = λρ(X), ∀λ ≥ 0. Their comonotonic additivity axiom and positive homogeneity imply Axiom A1.
3 For two random variables X and Y , if X first-order stochastically dominates Y , then P (X > x) ≥ P (Y > x) for all x, which implies that for a risk measure ρ represented by (2), ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ).
4 For α = 1, ES of X at level α is defined as ES 1 (X) := F −1 X (1).
(2002)), i.e.,
where F α,X (x) is the α-tail distribution defined as (Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) ):
If the loss distribution F X is continuous, then F α,X is the same as the conditional distribution of X given that X ≥ VaR α (X); if F X is not continuous, then F α,X (x) is a slight modification of the conditional loss distribution.
Example 3. Median shortfall (MS). As we will see later, expected shortfall has several statistical drawbacks including non-elicitability and non-robustness. To mitigate the problems, one may simply use median shortfall. In contrast to ES which is the mean of the tail loss distribution, MS is the median of the same tail loss distribution. More precisely, MS of X at level α ∈ [0, 1) is defined as (Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013) ) 6 MS α (X) := median of the α-tail distribution of X
For α = 1, MS at level α is defined as MS 1 (X) := F −1 X (1). Therefore, MS at level α can capture the tail risk and considers both the size and likelihood of losses beyond the VaR at level α, because it measures the median of the loss size conditional on that the loss exceeds the VaR at level α. It can be shown that 7
The term "median shortfall" is also used in Moscadelli (2004) and So and Wong (2012) but is respectively defined as median[X|X > u] for a constant u and median[X|X > VaR α (X)], which are different from ours. Furthermore, the definition in the aforementioned second paper is the same as the "tail conditional median" proposed in Kou, Peng and Heyde (2006) . 7 Indeed, for α ∈ (0, 1), by definition,
X); for α = 1, by definition, MS 1 (X) = F −1 X (1) = VaR 1 (X); for α = 0, by definition, F 0,X = F X and hence MS 0 (X) = F −1 X ( 1 2 ) = VaR 1 2 (X).
Hence, ρ(X) in (2) 
where m is a probability measure on (0, 1]. The class of risk measures represented by
(2) include and are strictly larger than the class of generalized spectral risk measures, as they all satisfy Axioms A1-A5. 8 A special case of (4) is the spectral risk measure (Acerbi (2002) ), defined as
wherem is a probability measure on [0, 1]; it corresponds to (4) with m being specified
The MINMAXVAR risk measure proposed in Cherny and Madan (2009) for the measurement of trading performance is a special case of the spectral risk measure, corresponding to a distortion function h(
If a risk measure ρ satisfies Axiom A4 (law invariance), then ρ(X) only depends on F X ; hence, ρ induces a statistical functional that maps a distribution F X to a real number ρ(X). For simplicity of notation, we still denote the induced statistical functional as ρ. Namely, we will use ρ(X) and ρ(F X ) interchangeably in the sequel.
Elicitability
In practice, the measurement of risk of X using ρ is a point forecasting problem, because the true distribution F X is unknown and one has to find an estimateF X 8 In fact, for any fixed u ∈ (0, 1], F −1 X (u) = VaR u (X) as a functional on L ∞ (Ω, F , P ) is a special case of the risk measure (2). By the proof of Lemma 2.1, VaR u satisfies monotonicity, positive homogeneity, and comonotonic additivity, which implies that ρ m satisfies Axioms A1-A4. On L ∞ (Ω, F , P ), ρ m automatically satisfies Axiom A5. On the other hand, for an α ∈ (0, 1), the right quantile q + α (X) := inf{x | F X (x) > α} is a special case of the risk measure defined in (2) with h(x) being defined as h(x) := 1 {x≥1−α} , but it can be shown that q + α cannot be represented by (4). Indeed, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists an m such that q + α (X) = ρ m (X), ∀X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F , P ). Let X 0 have a strictly positive density on its support. Then, F −1 X0 (u) is continuous and strictly increases on (0, 1]. Let c > 0 be a constant. Define
for forecasting the unknown true value ρ(F X ). As one may come up with different procedures to forecast ρ(F X ), it is an important issue to evaluate which procedure provides a better forecast of ρ(F X ). The theory of elicitability provides a decision-theoretic foundation for effective evaluation of point forecasting procedures. Suppose one wants to forecast the realization of a random variable Y using a point x, without knowing the true distribution F Y . The expected forecasting error is given by
A statistical functional ρ is elicitable if there exists a forecasting objective function S such that minimizing the expected forecasting error yields ρ. Many statistical functionals are elicitable. For example, the median functional is elicitable, as minimizing the expected forecasting error with S(x, y) = |x−y| yields the median functional. If ρ is elicitable, then one can evaluate two point forecasting methods by comparing their respective expected forecasting error ES(x, Y ). As F Y is unknown, the expected forecasting error can be approximated by the average 1
. , Y n are samples of Y and x 1 , . . . , x n are the corresponding point forecasts.
If a statistical functional ρ is not elicitable, then for any objective function S, the minimization of the expected forecasting error does not yield the true value ρ(F ).
Hence, one cannot tell which one of competing point forecasts for ρ(F ) performs the best by comparing their forecasting errors, no matter what objective function S is used.
The concept of elicitability dates back to the pioneering work of Savage (1971) , Thomson (1979) , and Osband (1985) and is comprehensively developed by Gneiting (2011) , who contends that "in issuing and evaluating point forecasts, it is essential that either the objective function (i.e., the function S) be specified ex ante, or an elicitable target functional be named, such as an expectation or a quantile, and objective functions be used that are consistent for the target functional." Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009) also points out the critical importance of the specification of an objective function or an elicitable target functional. See also Embrechts and Hofert (2014) .
In the present paper, we are concerned with the measurement of risk, which is
given by a single-valued statistical functional. Following Definition 2 in Gneiting (2011) , where the elicitability for a set-valued statistical functional is defined, we define the elicitability for a single-valued statistical functional as follows. 9
Definition 2.1. A single-valued statistical functional ρ(·) is elicitable with respect to a class of distributions P if there exists a forecasting objective function S :
In the definition, we do not impose any condition on the objective function S.
Main Result
The following Theorem 2.1 shows that median shortfall is the only risk measure that (i) captures tail risk; (ii) is elicitable; and (iii) has the decision-theoretic foundation of Choquet expected utility (i.e., satisfying Axioms A1-A5), because the mean apparently does not capture tail risk.
Theorem 2.1. Let ρ : X → R be a risk measure that satisfies Axioms A1-A5 and X ⊃ L ∞ (Ω, F , P ). Let P := {F X | X ∈ X }. Then, ρ(·) (viewed as a statistical functional on P) is elicitable with respect to P if and only if one of the following two cases holds:
The major difficulty of the proof lies in that the distortion function h(·) in the representation equation (2) of risk measures satisfying Axioms A1-A5 can have various kinds of discontinuities on [0, 1]; in particular, the proof is not based on any assumption on left or right continuity of h(·). The outline of the proof is as follows. First, we show that a necessary condition for ρ to be elicitable is that ρ has convex level sets,
, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1). The second and the key step is to show that only four kinds of risk measures have convex level sets:
(iv) the mean functional. Lastly, we examine the elicitability of the aforementioned four kinds of risk measures; in particular, we show that ρ = cq − α + (1 − c)q + α for c ∈ [0, 1) is not elicitable by extending the main proposition in Thomson (1979) .
Distributional Robustness of MS
One commonly accepted definition of robustness is the distributional robustness proposed in Hampel (1971) . Suppose the true loss distribution is F and we want to calculate ρ(F ). Since F is unknown, we have to use a modelF to approximate F and what we can compute is ρ(F ) instead of ρ(F ). ρ is robust with respect to model misspecification means that: if the misspecified modelF only slightly deviates from F , then ρ(F ) only slightly differ from ρ(F ). This definition of robustness is closely analogous to the definition of stability of ordinary differential equations (ODEs): a small change to the initial condition of the ODE only results in a small change to the solution of the ODE.
More precisely, let X 1 , X 2 , . . . be a sequence of independent observations with distribution F . Let T n = T n (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a sequence of estimates. The sequence is called Hampel- 
Lemma 2.2. (i) For any α ∈ (0, 1) and any F 0 such that F −1 0 (·) is continuous at
Proof. (i) Let δ (1+α)/2 be the Dirac delta measure on (0, 1) that has a point mass 1
contains the support of δ (1+α)/2 , it follows from Theorem 3.7 in Huber and Ronchetti (2009) 
Then MS α (F n ) = f n ((X 1 , . . . , X n )). It can be shown that f n is continuous on R n . 11
Then, it follows from the corollary of Theorem 1 in Hampel (1971) 
contains the support of m, it follows from Theorem 3.7 in Huber and Ronchetti (2009) that ES α is discontinuous at F 0 . Lastly, it follows from Theorem 2.21 in Huber and Ronchetti (2009) 
Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013) show that robustness is indispensable for external risk measures that are used for legal enforcement, such as risk measures for calculating trading book capital requirements, so that law can be enforced consistently, not sensitive to uncertainty in distribution. 13 11 See, e.g., Proposition 4.1 in Wen et al. (2013) .
n(1−α) X (i) = J n g n in the notation of Van Zwet (1980) (with g = F −1 ). Then J n satisfies the condition (i) of Theorem 2.1 for p = ∞. For any fixed t < α, J n (s) = 0, ∀s ∈ (0, t), when n is large enough. Hence, lim n→∞
Hence, J n and J satisfy the condition of Corollary 2.1 of Van Zwet (1980) . Therefore, it follows from Corollary 2.1 that ES α (F n ) → ES α (F ) a.s.
13 Another meaning of robustness refers to that a small change of the data set, such as changing a few samples, or adding a few outliers to the data set, or making small changes to many samples, only results in a small change to the estimated risk measure (Huber and Ronchetti (2009) ). Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013, Appendix F) also show that MS is a robust statistic but ES is not, by using
Extension to Incorporate Multiple Models
The previous sections address the issue of model uncertainty from the perspective of elicitability and distributional robustness. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2007) , we further incorporate robustness by considering multiple models (scenarios). 14 More precisely, we consider m probability measures P i , i = 1, . . . , m on the state space (Ω, F ). Each P i corresponds to one model or one scenario, which may refer to a specific economic regime such as an economic boom and a financial crisis. The loss distribution of a random loss X under different scenarios can be substantially different. For example, the VaR calculated under the scenario of the 2007 financial crisis is much higher than that under a scenario corresponding to a normal market condition due to the difference of loss distributions.
Suppose that under the ith scenario, the measurement of risk is given by ρ i that satisfy Axioms A1-A5. Then by Lemma 2.1, ρ i can be represented by ρ i (X) = Xd(h i • P i ), where h i is a distortion function, i = 1, . . . , m. We then propose the following risk measure to incorporate multiple scenarios:
where f : R m → R is called a scenario aggregation function. We postulate that the scenario aggregation function f satisfies the following axioms:
Axiom B1. Positive homogeneity and translation scaling: f (ax + b1) = af (x) + sb, ∀x ∈ R m , ∀a ≥ 0, ∀b ∈ R, where s > 0 is a constant and 1 := (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ R m .
Axiom B1 states that if the risk measurement of Y is an affine function of that of X under each scenario, then the aggregate risk measurement of Y is also an affine another three tools of robust statistics, i.e, influence functions, asymptotic breakdown points, and finite-sample breakdown points. Lemma 2.2 imply Proposition 3 and part 1 of Corollary 2 in Cont, Deguest and Scandolo (2010) but not vice versa, where a more restrictive definition of robustness is considered; note that since the Corollary 2 is implied from their Proposition 4, which requires the condition that "no discontinuity of φ coincides with a discontinuity of q F ", this condition should also be added to Corollary 2.
14 Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2013) show that the maxmin approach of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is equivalent to the minimax approach in robust statistics. function of that of X. Axiom B2 states that if the risk measurement of X is less than or equal to that of Y under each scenario, then the aggregate risk measurement of X is also less than or equal to that of Y . Axiom B3 is proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to "capture the phenomenon of hedging"; it is used as one of the axioms for the maxmin expected utility that incorporates robustness. 
Proof. First, we show that Axioms B1-B3 are equivalent to the Axioms C1-C4 in Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013) with n i = 1, i = 1, . . . , m. Axioms B1 and B2 are the same as the Axioms C1 and C2, respectively. Axiom C4 holds for any function when n i = 1, i = 1, . . . , m. Axioms C1 and C3 apparently implies Axiom B3. We will then show that Axiom B1 and B3 imply Axiom C3. In fact, For anyx andỹ, it follows from Axiom B1 that f (
Hence, Axiom C3 holds. Therefore, Axioms B1-B3 are equivalent to Axioms C1-C4, and hence the conclusion of the lemma follows from Theorem 3.1 in Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013) .
In the representation (7), each weightw ∈ W can be regarded as a prior probability on the set of scenarios; more precisely, w i can be viewed as the likelihood that the scenario i happens.
Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 3.1 lead to the following class of risk measures: 15
By Theorem 2, the requirement of elicitability under each scenario leads to the following tail risk measure
where MS i,α i (X) is the median shortfall of X at confidence level α i calculated under the ith scenario (model). The risk measure ρ in (9) addresses the issue of model uncertainty and incorporate robustness from two aspects: (i) under each scenario i, MS i,α i is elicitable and has distributional robustness; (ii) ρ incorporates multiple scenarios and multiple priors on the set of scenarios.
Application to Basel Accord Capital Rule for Trading Books
What risk measure should be used for setting capital requirements for banks is an important issue that has been under debate since the 2007 financial crisis. The Basel II use a 99.9% VaR for setting capital requirements for banking books of financial institutions (Gordy (2003) ). The Basel II capital charge for the trading book on the tth day is specified as ρ(X) := s max 1
, where X is the trading book loss; s ≥ 3 is a constant; VaR t−i (X) is the 10-day VaR at 99% confidence level calculated on day t − i, which corresponds to the ith model, i = 1, . . . , 60. Define the 61-th model under which X = 0 with probability one. Then, the Basel II risk measure is a special case of the class of risk measures considered in (9); it incorporates 61 models and two priors: one isw = (1/s, 0, . . . , 0, 1 − 1/s), the otherw = (1/60, 1/60, . . . , 1/60, 0). The Basel 2.5 risk measure (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009)) mitigates the procyclicality of the Basel II risk measure by incorporating the "stressed VaR" calculated under stressed market conditions such as financial crisis. The Basel 2.5 risk measure can also be written in the form of (9).
In a consultative document released by the Bank for International Settlement (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013)), the Basel Committee proposes to "move from value-at-risk to expected shortfall," which "measures the riskiness of a position by considering both the size and the likelihood of losses above a certain confidence level." The proposed new Basel (called Basel 3.5) capital charge for the trading book measured on the tth day is defined as ρ(X) := s max 1 s ES t−1 , 1 60 60 i=1 ES t−i , where ES t−i is the ES at 97.5% confidence level calculated on day t − i, i = 1, . . . , 60; hence, the proposed Basel 3.5 risk measure is a special case of the class of risk measures considered in (8). 16 The major argument for the change from VaR to ES is that ES better captures tail risk than VaR. The statement that the 99% VaR is 100 million dollars does no carry information as to the size of loss in cases when the loss does exceed 100 million; on the other hand, the 99% ES measures the mean of the size of loss given that the loss exceeds the 99% VaR.
Although the argument sounds reasonable, ES is not the only risk measure that captures tail risk; in particular, an alternative risk measure that captures tail risk is median shortfall (MS), which, in contrast to expected shortfall, measures the median rather than the mean of the tail loss distribution. For instance, in the aforementioned example, if we want to capture the size and likelihood of loss beyond the 99% VaR level, we can use either ES at 99% level, or, alternatively, MS at 99% level.
It follows from Theorem 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 that MS may be preferable than ES for setting capital requirements in banking regulation because MS is elicitable and robust, but ES is neither elicitable nor robust.
To further compare the robustness of MS with ES, we carry out a simple empirical study on the measurement of tail risk of S&P 500 daily return. We consider two IGARCH(1, 1) models similar to the model of RiskMetrics:
• Model 1: IGARCH(1, 1) with conditional distribution being Gaussian
∼ N(0, 1).
• Model 2: the same as model 1 except that the conditional distribution is specified as ǫ t d ∼ t ν , where t ν denotes t distribution with degree of freedom ν.
We respectively fit the two models to the historical data of daily returns of S&P 500 Index during 1/2/1980-11/26/2012 and then forecast the one-day MS and ES of a portfolio of S&P 500 stocks that is worth 1,000,000 dollars on 11/26/2012. The comparison of the forecasts of MS and ES under the two models is shown in and Heyde (2013). The natural risk statistics are axiomatized by a different set of axioms including a comonotonic subadditivity axiom. 
Comments
It is worth noting that it is not desirable for a risk measure to be too sensitive to the tail risk. For example, let L denote the loss that could occur to a person who walks on the street. There is a very small but positive probability that the person could be hit by a car and lose his life; in that unfortunate case, L may be infinite. Hence, the ES of L may be equal to infinity, suggesting that the person should never walk on the street, which is apparently not reasonable. In contrast, the MS of L is a finite number.
Theorem 2.1 generalizes the main result in Ziegel (2013) , which shows the only elicitable spectral risk measure is the mean functional; note that VaR is not a spectral risk measure. Bellini and Bignozzi (2013) (whose proof is related to Weber (2006) ) suggest a more restrictive definition of elicitability than Gneiting (2011) ; under their definition, median or quantile may not be elicitable, while they are always elicitable in the sense of Gneiting (2011) . The elicitability of a risk measure is also related to the concept of "consistency" of a risk measure introduced in Davis (2013).
The axioms in this paper are based on economic considerations. Other axioms based on mathematical considerations include subadditivity (Huber (1981 ), Artzner et al. (1999 ), 17 comonotonic subadditivity Yan (2006, 2009) , Heyde (2006, 2013) ), convexity (Föllmer and Schied (2002) , Frittelli and Gianin (2002) ), comonotonic convexity Yan (2006, 2009) ).
The subadditivity axiom is somewhat controversial: 18 (i) The subadditivity axiom is based on an intuition that "a merger does not create extra risk" (Artzner et al. (1999) , p. 209), which may not be true, as can be seen from the merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch in 2008. (ii) Subadditivity is related to the idea that diversification is beneficial; however, diversification may not always be beneficial. Fama and Miller (1972, pp. 271-272) show that diversification is ineffective for asset returns with heavy tails (with tail index less than 1); these results are extended in Ibragimov and Walden (2007) and Ibragimov (2009) . See Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013, Sec. 6 .1) for more discussion. (iii) Although subadditivity ensures that ρ(X 1 ) + ρ(X 2 ) is an upper bound for ρ(X 1 + X 2 ), this upper bound may not be valid in face of model uncertainty. 19 (iv) In practice, ρ(X 1 ) + ρ(X 2 ) may not be a useful upper bound for ρ(X 1 + X 2 ) as the former may be too larger than the latter. 20 (v) Subadditivity is not necessarily needed for capital allocation or asset allocation. 21 18 Even if one believes in subadditivity, VaR (and median shortfall) satisfies subadditivity in most relevant situations. In fact, Daníelsson, Jorgensen, Samorodnitsky, Sarma and de Vries (2013) show that VaR (and median shortfall) is subadditive in the relevant tail region if asset returns are regularly varying and possibly dependent, although VaR does not satisfy global subadditivity. Ibragimov and Walden (2007) and Ibragimov (2009) show that VaR is subadditive for the infinite variance stable distributions with finite mean. "In this sense, they showed that VaR is subadditive for the tails of all fat distributions, provided the tails are not super fat (e.g., Cauthy distribution)" (Gaglianone, Lima, Linton and Smith (2011) ). Garcia, Renault and Tsafack (2007) stress that "tail thickness required [for VaR] to violate subadditivity, even for small probabilities, remains an extreme situation because it corresponds to such poor conditioning information that expected loss appears to be infinite." 19 In fact, suppose we are concerned with obtaining an upper bound for ES α (X 1 +X 2 ). In practice, due to model uncertainty, we can only compute ES α (X 1 ) and ES α (X 2 ), which are estimates of ES α (X 1 ) and ES α (X 2 ) respectively. ES α (X 1 ) + ES α (X 2 ) cannot be used as an upper bound for ES α (X 1 + X 2 ) because it is possible that ES α (X 1 ) + ES α (X 2 ) < ES α (X 1 ) + ES α (X 2 ). 20 For example, let X 1 be the loss of a long position of a call option on a stock (whose price is $100) at strike $100 and let X 2 be the loss of a short position of a call option on that stock at strick $95. Then the margin requirement for X 1 +X 2 , ρ(X 1 +X 2 ), should not be larger than $5, as X 1 +X 2 ≤ 5. However, ρ(X 1 ) = 0 and ρ(X 2 ) ≈ 20 (the margin is around 20% of the underlying stock price). In this case, no one would use the subadditivity to charge the upper bound ρ(X 1 ) + ρ(X 2 ) ≈ 20 as the margin for the portfolio X 1 + X 2 ; instead, people will directly compute ρ(X 1 + X 2 ). 21 Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013, Sec. 7) derive the Euler capital allocation rule for a class of risk measures including VaR with scenario analysis and the Basel Accord risk measures. see Shi and Werker (2012) , Wen, Peng, Liu, Bai and Sun (2013) , Xi, Coleman and Li (2013) , and the references therein for asset allocation methods using VaR and Basel Accord risk measures.
A Proof of Theorem 2.1
First, we give the following definition: 22 Definition A.1. A single-valued statistical functional ρ is said to have convex level sets with respect to P, if for any two distributions F 1 ∈ P and F 2 ∈ P, ρ(F 1 ) = ρ(F 2 ) implies that ρ(λF 1 + (1 − λ)F 2 ) = ρ(F 1 ), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
The following Lemma A.1 gives a necessary condition for a single-valued statistical functional to be elicitable.
Lemma A.1. If a single-valued statistical functional ρ is elicitable with respect to P, then ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
Proof. Suppose ρ is elicitable. Then there exists a forecasting objective function S(x, y) such that (5) holds. For any two distribution F 1 and F 2 and any λ ∈ (0, 1),
arg min x S(x, y)dF λ (y), it holds that S(t ′ , y)dF λ (y) ≤ S(t, y)dF λ (y), which implies that λ S(t ′ , y)dF 1 (y) + (1 − λ) S(t ′ , y)dF 2 (y) ≤ λ S(t, y)dF 1 (y) + (1 − λ) S(t, y)dF 2 (y). However, by definition of t, S(t, y)dF i (y) ≤ S(t ′ , y)dF i (y), i = 1, 2. Therefore, S(t, y)dF i (y) = S(t ′ , y)dF i (y), i = 1, 2, which implies that t ′ ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF i (y), i = 1, 2. Since t = min{x | x ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF i (y)}, it follows that t ′ ≥ t. Therefore, t = min{x | x ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF λ (y)} = ρ(F λ ).
In addition, ρ has convex level sets with respect to P = {F | ρ(F ) is well defined}.
Proof. If VaR 0 (F ) ≥ 0, then
If VaR 0 (F ) < 0, similar calculation also leads to ρ(F ) = cVaR 0 (F ) + (1 − c)VaR 1 (F ).
Suppose t = ρ(F 1 ) = ρ(F 2 ). Denote F λ := λF 1 + (1 − λ)F 2 , λ ∈ (0, 1). There are three cases: (i) c = 0. Then, t = VaR 1 (F 1 ) = VaR 1 (F 2 ). By definition of VaR 1 , F i (x) < 1 for
x < t and F i (x) = 1 for x ≥ t. Hence, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), it holds that F λ (x) < 1 for
. Hence, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), VaR 0 (F λ ) = VaR 0 (F 1 ) and VaR 1 (F λ ) = VaR 1 (F 1 ). Hence, ρ(F λ ) = t.
(iii) c = 1. Then, t = VaR 0 (F 1 ) = VaR 0 (F 2 ). By definition of VaR 0 , F i (x) = 0 for
x < t and F i (x) > 0 for x > t. Hence, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), it holds that F λ (x) = 0 for x < t and F λ (x) > 0 for x > t. Hence, ρ(F λ ) = VaR 0 (F λ ) = t. 
where q − α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) ≥ α} and q + α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) > α}. Furthermore, ρ has convex level sets with respect to P = {F X | X is a proper random variable}.
Proof. Define g(x) := 1 − h(1 − x), x ∈ [0, 1]. Then, g(x) = c · 1 {x=α} + 1 {x>α} , and ρ can be represented as
Note that F (x) = α for x ∈ [q − α (F ), q + α (F )). Consider three cases:
which completes the proof of (10). We then show that ρ has convex level sets with respect to P. Suppose that ρ(F 1 ) = ρ(F 2 ). Then
For λ ∈ (0, 1), define F λ := λF 1 + (1 − λ)F 2 . There are three cases:
x < t, which implies t = q + α (F λ ), i.e., q + α has convex level sets with respect to P. (ii) c ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, assume q − α (F 1 ) ≥ q − α (F 2 ). Then it follows from (11) 
, which implies that ρ(F λ ) = ρ(F 1 ). Therefore, ρ has convex level sets.
(
i.e., q − α has convex level sets with respect to P.
Next, we prove the following Theorem A.1, which shows that among the class of risk measures based on Choquet expected utility theory, only four kinds of risk measures satisfy the necessary condition of being elicitable.
Theorem A.1. Let P 0 be the set of distributions with finite support. Let h be a distortion function defined on [0, 1] and let ρ(·) be defined as in (2). Then, ρ(·) has convex level sets with respect to P 0 if and only if one of the following four cases holds:
(ii) There exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that ρ(F ) = VaR α (F ), ∀F .
(iii) There exists α ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ [0, 1) such that
where q − α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) ≥ α} and q + α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) > α}.
(iv) ρ(F ) = xdF (x), ∀F .
Furthermore, the risk measures listed above have convex level sets with respect to P defined in Theorem 2.1.
Then g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1, and g is increasing on [0, 1]. And then, ρ can be represented as
For a discrete distribution F = n i=1 p i δ x i , where 0 ≤ x 1 < x 2 < · · · < x n , p i > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, and n i=1 p i = 1, it can be shown by simple calculation that ρ(F ) = g(p 1 )x 1 + n i=2 (g( i j=1 p j ) − g( i−1 j=1 p j ))x i .
There are three cases for g: Case (i): for any q ∈ (0, 1), g(q) = 0. Then g(u) = 1 {u=1} . By Lemma A.2 (with c = 0), ρ = VaR 1 and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P. Case (ii): there exists q 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q 0 ) = 1 and g(q) ∈ {0, 1} for all q ∈ (0, 1). Let α = inf{q | g(q) = 1}. There are three subcases: (ii.i) α = 0. Then, g(u) = 1 {u>0} . By Lemma A.2 (with c = 1), ρ = VaR 0 and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P. (ii.ii) α ∈ (0, 1) and g(α) = 1. Then, g(u) = 1 {u≥α} . By Lemma A.3 (with c = 1), ρ = q − α = VaR α and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P. (ii.iii) α ∈ (0, 1) and g(α) = 0. Then, g(u) = 1 {u>α} . By Lemma A.3 (with c = 0), ρ = q + α and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P. Case (iii): there exists q ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q) ∈ (0, 1). Suppose ρ has convex level sets with respect to P 0 . For any 0 < x 1 < x 2 and q ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy
since ρ has convex level sets, it follows that
For any q ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q) ∈ (0, 1), (13) holds for any (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1 − c, − g(q) 1−g(q) (1 − c) + 1 1−g(q) ), ∀c ∈ (0, 1). Noting that x 1 < 1 < x 2 , (14) implies
(1 − g(vq + 1 − v)) , ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀c ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore,
(1−g(vq +1−v)) = 0, ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀q such that g(q) ∈ (0, 1). (15) Let α = sup{q | g(q) = 0, q ∈ [0, 1]} and β = inf{q | g(q) = 1, q ∈ [0, 1]}. Since there exists q 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q 0 ) ∈ (0, 1), it follows that α ≤ q 0 < 1, g(α) ≤ g(q 0 ) < 1, β ≥ q 0 > 0, and g(β) ≥ g(q 0 ) > 0.
There are four subcases: Case (iii.i) α = β and g(α) = c ∈ (0, 1). In this case, α = β ∈ (0, 1). By the definition of α and β, g(x) = 0 for x < α and g(x) = 1 for x > α. By Lemma A.3, ρ = cq − α + (1 − c)q + α and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P. Case (iii.ii) α < β and g(α) ∈ (0, 1). In this case, α ∈ (0, 1). It follows from the definition of β that g((α + β)/2) < 1. Let ǫ 0 = β − α. By the definition of β, g(α + ǫ) < 1 for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). In addition, g(α + ǫ) ≥ g(α) > 0 for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). Hence, g(α + ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). For any η ∈ (0, α) and ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), let q = α + ǫ and v = α−η α+ǫ . Then it follows from the definition of α that g(vq) = g(α − η) = 0, which implies from (15) that 1 = g(vq + 1 − v) = g(α − η + ǫ+η α+ǫ ), for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), η ∈ (0, α). Then, g(α+) = lim ǫ↓0,η↓0 g(α − η + ǫ+η α+ǫ ) = 1, which contradicts to g(α+) ≤ g((α + β)/2) < 1. Therefore, this case does not hold.
Case (iii.iii) α < β, g(α) = 0, and g(β) ∈ (0, 1). Since g(β) ∈ (0, 1), it follows that β ∈ (0, 1). By the definition of β, for any η ∈ (0, 1 − β), g(β + η) = 1.
By the definition of α, g((β + α)/2) > 0. Hence, g(β−) ≥ g((β + α)/2) > 0. Hence, there exists ǫ 0 > 0 such that g(β − ǫ) > 0 for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). On the other hand, g(β − ǫ) ≤ g(β) < 1 for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). Hence, g(β − ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). Then, for any η ∈ (0, 1 − β) and ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), let q = β − ǫ and v = 1−β−η 1−β+ǫ . Then, we have g(vq + 1 − v) = g(β + η) = 1. Since g(β − ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), it follows from (15) that 0 = g(vq) = g( 1−β−η 1−β+ǫ (β − ǫ)), which implies that g(β−) = lim η↓0,ǫ↓0 g( 1−β−η 1−β+ǫ (β − ǫ)) = 0. This contradicts to g(β−) > 0. Therefore, this case does not hold.
Case (iii.iv) α < β, g(α) = 0, g(β) = 1. Let q 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q 0 ) ∈ (0, 1).
Then, α < q 0 < β. We will show that either there exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1) such that g(u) = c, ∀u ∈ (0, 1), or g(u) = u, ∀u ∈ (0, 1).
First, we will show that α = 0 and β = 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that α > 0. Since α < q 0 , it follows that g(α + ǫ) < 1 for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), where ǫ 0 = q 0 −α. Furthermore, by the definition of α, g(α+ǫ) > 0 for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). Hence, g(α + ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). For any η ∈ (0, α) and ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), let q = α + ǫ and v = α−η α+ǫ . Then it follows from the definition of α that g(vq) = g(α − η) = 0, which implies from (15) that 1 = g(vq +1−v) = g(α−η + ǫ+η α+ǫ ), for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), η ∈ (0, α). Then, g(α+) = lim ǫ↓0,η↓0 g(α − η + ǫ+η α+ǫ ) = 1, which contradicts to g(α+) ≤ g(q 0 ) < 1. Therefore, α = 0.
In addition, suppose for the sake of contradiction that β < 1. Then, by the definition of β, for any η ∈ (0, 1 − β), g(β + η) = 1. Let ǫ 0 = β − q 0 . Since β > q 0 , g(β − ǫ) ≥ g(q 0 ) > 0 for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). By the definition of β, g(β − ǫ) < 1 for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). Hence, g(β −ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ). Then, for any η ∈ (0, 1−β) and ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), let q = β − ǫ and v = 1−β−η 1−β+ǫ . Then, we have g(vq + 1 − v) = g(β + η) = 1. Since g(β − ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ 0 ), it follows from (15) that 0 = g(vq) = g( 1−β−η 1−β+ǫ (β − ǫ)), which implies that g(β−) = lim η↓0,ǫ↓0 g( 1−β−η 1−β+ǫ (β − ǫ)) = 0. This contradicts to that g(β−) ≥ g(q 0 ) > 0. Therefore, β = 1.
Then, it follows from α = 0 and β = 1 that g(q) ∈ (0, 1), ∀q ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, it follows from (15) and (16) that
(1 − g(vq + 1 − v)) = 0, ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀q ∈ (0, 1).
For any q ∈ (0, 1) and v ∈ (0, 1), vq + 1 − v > q and lim v↑1 (vq + 1 − v) = q. It then follows from (17) that
(1 − g(q+)), ∀q ∈ (0, 1).
Second, we consider two cases for g:
Case (iii.iv.i) There exist 0 < u 1 < u 2 < 1 such that g(u 1 ) = g(u 2 ). Let w 1 = inf{u | g(u) = g(u 1 )} and w 2 = sup{u | g(u) = g(u 2 )}. Consider three further cases: which contradicts to (17) . Hence, this case cannot hold. (c) w 1 = 0 and w 2 = 1. In this case, g(u) = c, ∀u ∈ (0, 1), for some constant c ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma A.2, ρ = cVaR 0 + (1 − c)VaR 1 , and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
Case (iii.iv.ii) g is strictly increasing on (0, 1). Then, g(p 1 ) − g(p 2 ) = 0 for any p 1 = p 2 . We will show that g(1−) = 1 and g(0+) = 0. Consider 0 < x 1 < x 2 < x 3 and p 1 , p 2 ∈ (0, 1) such that
which is equivalent to
Let x 1 x 2 = c 1 and x 3 x 2 = c 3 . Then, c 1 ∈ (0, 1), c 3 > 1, and (19) is equivalent to
.
For any fixed 0 < p 1 < p 2 < 1 and 1 < c 3 < 1−g(p 1 ) 1−g(p 2 ) , define c 1 as in (20). Then, c 1 ∈ (0, 1). For any such p 1 , p 2 , c 3 , and c 1 , it follows from the convexity of the level sets of ρ that
Plugging (20) into the above equation, we obtain that for any 0 < p 1 < p 2 < 1, any 1 < c 3 < 1−g(p 1 ) 1−g(p 2 ) , and any v ∈ (0, 1), it holds that
Letting v ↑ 1 in (22), we obtain 0 = g(p 1 +)(1 − g(p 2 )) + g(1−)(g(p 2 ) − g(p 1 )) + g(p 1 )g(p 2 ) − g(p 2 ), ∀p 1 < p 2 . (23) Since g is increasing on (0, 1), there exists p * 1 ∈ (0, 1), such that g is continuous at p * 1 . Choose any p * 2 > p * 1 . Letting p 1 = p * 1 and p 2 = p * 2 in (23) leads to (g(p * 1 ) − g(p * 2 ))(1 − g(1−)) = 0. Since g is strictly increasing, it follows that
Letting q = 1 2 in (17) leads to
, ∀v ∈ (0, 1).
It follows from (25) and (24) that
We will then show that g is continuous on (0, 1). By (17), we have
(by (24) and (25)
Now consider 0 = x 1 < x 2 < x 3 < x 4 and p 1 , p 2 ∈ (0, 1) such that
x 1 g(p 1 ) + x 3 (1 − g(p 1 )) = x 2 g(p 2 ) + x 4 (1 − g(p 2 )).
Since ρ has convex level sets, it follows that for any v ∈ (0, 1), it holds that
Let x 3 x 2 = 1 + c 3 and x 4 x 2 = 1 + c 3 + c 4 . Then, c 3 > 0, c 4 > 0, and (28) becomes
Furthermore, (29) is equivalent to
For any 0 < p 1 < p 2 < 1 and c 4 > 0, let c 3 be defined in (30). Then, c 3 > 0. Hence, (31) holds for any such p 1 , p 2 , c 3 , and c 4 . Plugging (30) into (31), we obtain that for any 0 < p 1 < p 2 < 1 and any c 4 > 0, it holds that
which implies that
which can be simplified to be
Letting p 2 ↑ 1 in (33) and applying (24), we obtain − g((vp 1 + 1 − v)−) − (1 − g(p 1 )) g(vp 1 ) g(p 1 ) + 1 = 0, ∀0 < p 1 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (34) Then, it follows from (17) and (34) that
It follows from (18) and (35) that g is continuous on (0, 1), i.e., g(v−) = g(v) = g(v+), ∀v ∈ (0, 1).
Lastly, we will show that g(u) = u for any u ∈ (0, 1). Letting p 1 ↓ 0 in (33), we obtain − g(((1 − v)p 2 )+) − (g(p 2 ) − g(0+)) lim p 1 ↓0 g(vp 1 ) g(p 1 ) + g(p 2 ) = 0, ∀0 < p 2 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1).
Applying (26), (27), and (36) to (37), we obtain g((1 − v)p 2 ) = g(p 2 )(1 − g(v)), ∀0 < p 2 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1).
Letting p 2 ↑ 1 in (38) and using (24) and (36), we obtain
which in combination with (38) implies g(vp 2 ) = g(v)g(p 2 ), ∀0 < p 2 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1).
In the following, we will show by induction that g( k 2 n ) = k 2 n , k = 1, 2, . . . , 2 n − 1, ∀n ∈ N.
Letting v = 1 2 in (39), we obtain g( 1 2 ) = 1 2 . Hence, (41) holds for n = 1. Suppose (41) holds for n. We will show that it also holds for n+1. In fact, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ 2 n−1 −1, since 1 ≤ 2k + 1 ≤ 2 n − 1, it follows from (40) that
For any 2 n−1 ≤ k ≤ 2 n − 1, it holds that 1 ≤ 2 n+1 − (2k + 1) ≤ 2 n − 1. Hence, it follows from (39) that g( 2k + 1 2 n+1 ) = 1 − g( 2 n+1 − (2k + 1) 2 n+1 ) = 1 − 2 n+1 − (2k + 1) 2 n+1 (by (42)) = 2k + 1 2 n+1 , 2 n−1 ≤ k ≤ 2 n − 1.
In addition, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 n − 1, g( 2k 2 n+1 ) = g( k 2 n ) = k 2 n , which in combination with (42) and (43) implies that (41) holds for n + 1, and hence holds for any n. Since {k/2 n , k = 1, . . . , 2 n − 1, n ∈ N} is dense on (0, 1) and g is continuous on (0, 1), it follows from (41) that g(u) = u for all u ∈ (0, 1), which completes the proof.
Finally, the proof of Theorem 2.1 is as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. By Lemma A.1 and Theorem A.1, only those risk measures listed in cases (i)-(iv) of Theorem A.1 satisfy the necessary condition for being an elicitable risk measure. Therefore, we only need to study the elicitability of those risk measures.
First, we will show that for c ∈ (0, 1], ρ = cVaR 0 + (1 − c)VaR 1 is not elicitable. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ρ is elicitable, then there exists a function S such that (5) holds. For any u, letting F = δ u in (5) and noting ρ(δ u ) = u yields S(u, u) ≤ S(x, u), ∀x, ∀u, and the equality holds only if u ≤ x.
For any u < v and p ∈ (0, 1), letting F = pδ u + (1 − p)δ v in (5) 
Letting x = v in (45), we obtain
By (44) Therefore, for any F ∈ P, ρ(F ) = min{x | x ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF (y)}. Third, we will show that for any α ∈ (0, 1), VaR α is elicitable with respect to P.
Let g(·) be a strictly increasing function defined on R. Define S(x, y) = (1 {x≥y} − α)(g(x) − g(y)).
and define P = {F X | E|g(X)| < ∞}. 23 It follows from Theorem 9 in Gneiting (2011) that [q − α (F ), q + α (F )] = arg min x S(x, y)dF (y),
where q − α (F ) := inf{y | F (y) ≥ α} and q + α (F ) := inf{y | F (y) > α}. Therefore, VaR α (F ) = q − α (F ) satisfies (5) with S defined in (47). Fourth, we will show that ρ defined in (12) is not elicitable with respect to P. Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that ρ is elicitable. Fix any a > 0 and denote I := (−a, a). Let P I be the set of probability measures that have strictly positive probability density on the interval I and whose support is I. Then since P I ⊂ P and ρ is elicitable with respect to P, ρ is also elicitable with respect to P I . Therefore, there exists a forecasting objective function S(x, y) such that ρ(F ) = min{x | x ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF (y)}, ∀F ∈ P I .
For any F ∈ P I , the equation F (x) = α has a unique solution q α (F ) and q − α (F ) = q α (F ) = q + α (F ). Hence, ρ(F ) = q α (F ), ∀F ∈ P I . Therefore, we have q α (F ) ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF (y), ∀F ∈ P I .
Then, it follows from the proposition in Thomson (1979, p. 372 ) that 24 there exist measurable functions A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , and B 2 such that S(x, y) = A 1 (x) + B 1 (y) a.e. if y ≤ x, A 2 (x) + B 2 (y) a.e. if y > x,
and (A 1 (x 1 ) − A 1 (x 2 ))α + (A 2 (x 1 ) − A 2 (x 2 ))(1 − α) = 0, ∀x 1 , x 2 ∈ I.
Choose a distribution F 0 ∈ P such that q − α (F 0 ) < q + α (F 0 ), F 0 has a density f 0 that satisfies f 0 (x) = 0 for x ∈ (q − α (F 0 ), q + α (F 0 )), and F 0 (q − α (F 0 )) = F 0 (q + α (F 0 )) = α. Then, 23 For example, if g(x) := x, then P = {F X | X ∈ L 1 (Ω, F , P )}; if g(x) := x 1 2n+1 (n ≥ 1), then P includes heavy tailed distributions with infinite mean such as Cauchy distribution.
24 Thomson (1979) obtains the proposition for the case when the interval I = (−∞, ∞); in our case, I = (−a, a). It can be verified that the proof of the proposition in Thomson (1979) can be easily adapted to the case of I = (−a, a). The details are available from the authors upon request.
it follows from (48) 
Since f 0 (x) = 0 for x ∈ (q − α (F 0 ), q + α (F 0 )), it follows that
Since c ∈ [0, 1), ρ(
. It then follows from (49), (50), (51), and (52) that for any
S(x, y)dF 0 (y) − S(ρ(F 0 ), y)dF 0 (y) = (A 1 (x) − A 1 (ρ(F 0 )))α + (A 2 (x) − A 2 (ρ(F 0 )))(1 − α) = 0, which in combination with ρ(F 0 ) ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF 0 (y) implies that [q − α (F 0 ), q + α (F 0 )] ⊂ arg min x S(x, y)dF 0 (y).
Therefore, ρ(F 0 ) = min{x | x ∈ arg min x S(x, y)dF 0 (y)} ≤ q − α (F 0 ), which contradicts to ρ(F 0 ) > q − α (F 0 ). Hence, ρ defined in (12) is not elicitable. Fifth, it follows from Theorem 7 in Gneiting (2011) that ρ(F ) := xdF (x) is elicitable with respect to P. The proof is thus completed.
